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I. INTRODUCTION
Research in Motion, Inc. (RIM) is the provider of the popular BlackBerry
wireless message device, which allows "out-of-office" users to send and receive
electronic mail messages without the need of a personal computer.' Since its
public release in 1999, the BlackBerry has achieved great success in the
marketplace, surpassing six million subscribers in 2006.2 However, this success
has not been achieved without at least one significant obstacle. On November
13, 2001, NTP, Inc. filed suit against RIM alleging that the BlackBerry wireless
message device infringed on several of its patents.3 Following trial, a jury
concluded that RIM had infringed on NTP's patents and awarded nearly $54
million in damages to NTP.4 More importantly, the trial court issued a permanent
injunction, which was stayed pending appeal, ordering RIM to shut down its
popular BlackBerry service so long as the device infringed upon NTP's patents.'
Although the patents asserted by NTP were of questionable validity, the threat of
a permanent injunction disrupting the BlackBerry system eventually forced RIM
to settle for $612.5 million.6 RIM was not the only company to be confronted
with an infringement claim asserted by NTP; Good Technology and Nokia were
also forced to pay large fees to NTP.7
As the BlackBerry litigation illustrates, there is an emerging problem in patent
law-the powerful patent troll. A patent troll can exist either as an individual
entity or a corporate entity. 8 Whether the patent troll is an individual or

NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
2 Mark Heinzl, R!Ms Profit Surges on BlackBery Subscriber Growth, WALL ST.J., Sept. 29, 2006, at

A3.
3 NTP, 418 F.3d at 1282.
4 Id. at 1292.
5Id.

6 Ian Austen, BlackBerr Senice to Continue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at C6; see also Yuki
Noguchi, Canada LobbiesforMaker of BlackBery; Offices Contacting U.S. on PatentReview, WASH. POST,
Feb. 22, 2006, at D1 (reporting that after failing on nearly every issue in court, RIM sought
reexamination of the NTP patents at issue). At the time of the RIM settlement, the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) had issued an initial finding of invalidity as to all patents
involved in the litigation. Id However, because the court was unlikely to respond to the USPTO's
initial findings, RIM was forced to settle. Id.
David V. Radack, Patent Trolls: Pay Up orFight?,LAW.J., Aug. 4, 2006, at 3. Indeed, RIM is
not the only major corporation confronted with a patent troll like NTP in past few years. Intel was
confronted in 2003 by a patent troll that demanded $8 billion for a patent purchased for nearly
$50,000. Id. Similarly, Medrad was forced to pay out a total of $1.25 billion to a patent troll in 2005.
Id.
8 David G. Barker, Trollor no Troll? PoliangPatent Usage with an Open Post-GrantReview, DUKE L.
& TECH. REv., Apr. 15, 2005, at 7; see also Patent Trolls: FactorFiction?: HearingBefore the Subcomm on
Courts, the Internet, and IntellectualProperty of the H. Comm. on the Judiday, 109th Cong. 14-17 (2006)
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corporation, these entities either receive or purchase the patent and wait until
another individual or a corporation creates and implements a product or service
that potentially infringes the patent held by the patent troll. 9 Once another party
uses the patent owned by the patent troll to implement a product or service, the
patent troll will generally wait until the industry builds up around the potentially
infringing product or service.'0 Following this industry build-up, the patent troll
will demand that the user of the patent pay a licensing fee." If the user of the
patent refuses to pay for a license to use the patent, the patent troll often will
bring legal action alleging patent infringement. 2 Many times, the patents held by
the patent troll are of questionable validity or the patents cover a trivial part of the
overall product. 3 Patent trolls generally are not interested in enforcing their right
to exclude others from using the patent, but rather, they use this right
opportunistically as a way of extracting a large, sometimes exorbitant, settlement
payment from the manufacturer of the product.'
Until recently, the Federal Circuit provided patent trolls with a very powerful
tool: the presumptive right to permanent injunctive relief following a finding of
infringement.' 5 Accordingly, when a company, such as RIM, is confronted with
an infringement action brought by a patent troll, such as NTP, it is forced to
make a difficult decision. The manufacturer or provider of the product or service
must decide whether to attempt to work around the patent, contest the alleged
infringement in court, or settle with the patent
troll and negotiate for a license to
6
service.'
or
product
the
of
use
continue
When faced with a patent troll, the manufacturer may attempt to work around
the alleged infringement by producing a product that does not infringe on the
patent.'" However, this option requires substantial research and cost, and may

[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Dean Kamen, President, DEKA Research & Dev. Corp.) (stating
that the term patent troll has been applied to the following parties: "those who don't manufacture
products embodying their patent[,] those who offer a license as an alternative to suing for patent
infringement[,] those who sue alleged infringers that have products already on the market[,] small
entities who sue large entities with deeper pockets[, and] those who don't 'use' their patent").
' Barker, supra note 8, at 7.
1o Id.
I Id
12

Id.

13

Id. at 8.

14 Michael J. Meurer, Controlng OpportunisticandAni-CompeitiveIntelkctualProperty Ligation,44

B.C. L. REv. 509, 512 (2003).
's See Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226,1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that "[i]t
is the general rule that an injunction will issue when infringement has been adjudged, absent a sound
reason for denying it').
16 Radack, spra note 7, at 3.
17

Id.
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not produce a suitable alternative.' 8 Alternatively, the manufacturer may decide
to contest the questionable patent infringement claim in court.' 9 If the
manufacturer decides to contest infringement, the manufacturer faces the high
cost of patent litigation and runs the risk of losing at trial and being permanently
enjoined from providing the product or service to the public.2 0 If enjoined, the
infringer may still attempt to work around the patent.2' However, the patent troll,
"confronted with another possible infringement by that party in the form of a
modified device will very likely seek to invoke the power of the court to punish
22
the adjudged infringer for contempt in violating the court's injunctive order.,
If working around the infringing product or service is not feasible, the
adjudged infringer may attempt to negotiate a license for the use of the patent.'
However, because the patent troll would have the protection of the permanent
injunction, the licensing fee would likely be extremely high. 24 For many
manufacturers, the possibility of being permanently enjoined is too large a risk to
contest the alleged infringement, and thus, they settle before final adjudication on
the merits.2" Because the patent troll is aware that the manufacturer or provider
is not in an optimal bargaining position, the settlement amount or licensing fee
is usually extremely high, as the $612.5 million RIM settlement indicates. 26 It is
not difficult to imagine that manufacturers are often reluctant to enter into
settlements of this type. Nonetheless, manufacturers or service providers seem
willing to settle before final adjudication in an effort to avoid being permanently
enjoined from using the patent, in which case the manufacturer would likely have
27
to pay much more for a license to use the patent.
One must ask the question-is this really what we want from our patent
system? However one defines the patent troll, there are commentators who argue
that trolling activities constitute a legitimate business model. 2' These proponents
of trolling assert that it is perfectly reasonable for a company with limited

18 Id.
19 Id.

20 See, e.g., VALUING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN JAPAN, BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES
61 (Ruth Taplin ed., 2004) (indicating that the average cost of patent litigation in the United States
is between $1.5 million and $2 million).
1 Radack, supra note 7,at 3.
2 KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
23 Radack, supra note 7, at 3.
24Meurer, supra note 14, at 516.
25 Id.

26 Hearings,supra note 8, at 1 (statement of Lamar Smith, Chairman, Subcom. on Courts, the

Internet, and Intellectual Property).
27 Id.

' Id.at 15 (statement of Dean Kamen, President, DEKA Research and Dev. Corp.).
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resources to focus on licensing patents to firms with the financial and
distributional capabilities to introduce the product into the market.29 Because, to
proponents of trolling, this is a reasonable and legal application of patent law,
protecting these patents with the presumptive right to a permanent injunction is
justified upon a finding of infringement. 30 Undoubtedly, activities that may be
considered trolling are sometimes legitimate, such as when university researchers
or small, independent inventors license their inventions.31 Nonetheless, there are
many entities who exploit the patent system and attempt to extract exorbitant
licensing fees from manufacturers or service providers by alleging infringement
based on questionable patents in which little investment on the part of the patent
troll has been made.32
Opponents of patent trolling concede that "injunctions are an important and
essential part of the patent system, [but] only parties who can show actual,
irreparable harm should be able to receive an injunction following a finding of
patent infringement."33 In addition, opponents of trolling argue that patent trolls
who bring patent infringement actions based on questionable or trivial patents
against a manufacturer of a successful product potentially have the negative
effects of raising transaction costs, raising the "cost of licensing or avoiding
infringement," and deterring innovation.34 For instance, a manufacturer may be
reluctant to implement a new product, fearing that a patent troll will bring an
infringement action against them based on patents of questionable validity.
Further, because the questionable patents generally held by patent trolls are not
easily discovered during examination of the prior art, the costs of avoiding
infringement will likely increase as manufacturers or service providers spend more
resources searching for these questionable patents.35 In light of these potential
negative effects of trolling activity, opponents argue that reform is needed to limit
36
the power of patent trolls.

Id.
'oId. at 16-17.
31 Id.
29

32 Id.at 30 (statement of Chuck Fish, Vice President & Chief Patent Counsel, Time Warner,

Inc.).
" Id.at 31.
34 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIEs,

A PATENT

SYSTEM FOR

THE 21ST CENTURY 95 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004), available at http://newton.nap.edu/

html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf.
3'Hearing, supra note 8, at 22 (statement of Paul Misener, Vice President for Global Policy,
Amazon.com).
31See, e.g., id. at 26-34 (statement of Chuck Fish, Vice President & Chief Patent Counsel, Time
Warner, Inc.) (offering suggestions for reform).
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There are many ways in which patent law can be reformed to limit the power
and practice of patent trolls. Congress has begun the process of patent reform,
and many proposed changes to the Patent Act have the potential to reduce the
power of patent trolls.37 In addition to legislative action, the United States
Supreme Court has recently entered the patent reform arena by taking the
opportunity to attack the Federal Circuit general rule of granting a permanent
injunction automatically upon finding that a valid patent had been infringed.38 In
reversing the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court held that upon a finding of
infringement, an injunction cannot be issued automatically.39 Rather, a court
must, upon a finding of infringement, apply the equitable principles of the
traditional balancing test used in other areas of the law to decide if an injunction
should issue.' Thus, it would seem that by losing the power of the automatic
injunction, much of the strength behind the patent troll has been dramatically
reduced. However, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's holding, it is likely that
patent trolls will continue to bring questionable claims of patent infringement.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the implications of the MercExchange
decision. Although the Supreme Court's holding is a step toward reducing the
power of the patent troll, this Note will conclude that, acting alone, the
MercExchange decision will have very little effect in practice, and thus,
complementary legislative action is necessary.
Part II of this Note discusses the history and current state of patent law in
terms of the availability of a permanent injunction upon a finding of patent
infringement. Part III of this Note discusses the implications of the MercExcbange
decision. In particular, this section will analyze the likely response of district
courts and patent trolls to the MercExchange decision. In addition, this section will
suggest a number of potential reforms that may further reduce the power of the
patent troll. These suggestions include improving the review of business-method
patent applications, adjusting the presumption of validity in patent infringement
actions involving business-method patents, eliminating the submarine patent, and
awarding damages that represent the prevailing patent troll's actual contribution
to the overall product or service. Without legislative adoption of at least some of
these suggested reforms, the MercExchangedecision, standing alone, will have little
effect on the patent troll.

" See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 283
to direct courts to "consider the fairness of the remedy in light of all the facts and the relevant
interests of the parties associated with the invention").
38 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006).
39 Id.
4

Id.
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II. BACKGROUND

Constitutional and statutory law provides that a patent owner has the exclusive
right to use the patented invention. Patent trolls mainly rely on two provisions
of the Patent Act to extract fees from parties alleged to be infringing upon a
patent: the provision allowing for non-disclosure of an application for a patent
and the provision allowing for injunctive relief. Prior to MercExchange, courts
generally issued a permanent injunction following a finding of infringement.
However, after the Supreme Court's MercExcange decision, courts are no longer
permitted to grant automatic injunctive relief. Rather, courts must use traditional
principles of equity when deciding whether to grant a permanent injunction.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LAW

The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to enact laws to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."41 In passing the Patent Act, Congress acted upon its constitutional
power, allowing inventors who meet certain requirements to obtain a patent for
their invention.42 Patent trolls rely on two provisions of the Patent Act to extract
large fees from alleged patent infringers: the provision that allows for submarine
patent applications4 3 and the provision that provides for injunctive relief."
First, under current patent law, a patent application must be published after
eighteen months, subject to a few exceptions.4" One such exception is that an
applicant may prevent publication of the application, thus concealing the
application, by agreeing to file for patent protection only in the United States.'
This hidden application is often referred to as a submarine patent application.47
Second, the Patent Act provides for injunctive relief against infringing activity.
Among the rights gained by obtaining a patent is the "right to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
United States" for the duration of the protection period." This language indicates
that the patent owner has the right to force an infringing party to cease use of the
41 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.
8.
42 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).

35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2000).
-4s35
(2000).
35 U.S.C.
U.S.C. §§ 283
122(b)(1)(A).
43

- 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i).
47 See Supreme Court Development: No. 05-130,

21 BERKELEY

TECH.

L.J. 999, 1006 (2000)

(discussing the submarine patent).
41

35 U.-S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
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protected patent. Indeed, the Patent Act requires that a court award the owner
of a patent adequate damages to compensate for infringement. 49 However, if a
patent is infringed upon, pecuniary damages may not be adequate.
In addition to being compensated for the loss already suffered, patent owners
generally wish to prevent further loss by halting the infringing activity through
injunctive relief. The Patent Act states that courts "may grant injunctions in
accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right
secured by patent."5 Without the right of an injunction, the United States patent
system would in effect force patent owners to license their patents whenever
another entity infringes upon the patent.51 A compulsory licensing system would
stand in stark contrast to the language of the U.S. Constitution and the Patent
Act. 2 The "right to exclude" language found in the Patent Act and the U.S.
Constitution indicates that patents are considered to be property for which an
injunction should always be available to protect.5 3 However, this conflicts to
some degree with the Patent Act's assertion that the courts "may" grant a
permanent injunction upon a finding of infringement.5 4 Congress's election to
provide courts with discretion when determining whether to grant a permanent
injunction indicates that the right to exclude an infringer from using the patent
is not absolute.55 Because there is some ambiguity as to whether a patent owner
has the right to a permanent injunction upon a finding that the patent has been
infringed, examination of judicial interpretation of the right to an injunction under
the Patent Act is necessary.
B. PRE-MERCEXCHANGE REMEDIAL PRACTICE

Prior to the Supreme Court's MercExcbangedecision, the widely established law
stated that, once infringement of a valid patent is found, an order for an

U.S.C. §284 (2000).
1035 U.S.C. § 283 (2000).
49 35

" Hearings,supra note 8, at 17 (statement of Dean Kamen).
s2 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8 ("exclusive Right" to the invention); 35 U.S.C.

§

154(a)(1)

("right to exclude others from ... using" the invention).
- See MercExchange, LLC, v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating that the
"right to exclude recognized in a patent is but the essence of the concept of property" (quoting
Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226,1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989))), vacatedandremanded, 126

S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
54 35 U.S.C. § 283.
" See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006) (rejecting the
proposition that the right to exclude is an absolute right and stating that the right is subject to

limitations).
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injunction will almost always follow.5 6 Indeed, before the MercExchange decision,
the Federal Circuit and district courts routinely granted permanent injunctions to
patent owners upon a finding of infringement. 7 The general rule of granting a
permanent injunction upon a finding of validity and infringement was subject to
only one exception: an injunction could be denied when the public interest
mandated such denial.58
Of particular importance to the argument of the patent troll is the Supreme
Court's Continental Paper decision.59 The ContinentalPaperlitigation involved an
alleged infringement of a patent granted for an improvement to a particular

56

See, e.g., 7

DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS:

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF

PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY, AND INFRINGEMENT § 20.04[2] (2006) (stating that unless dictated

otherwise by public interest, a permanent injunction will generally follow a finding of infringement);
ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

§

13.1 (5th ed. 2001) (stating that

"[b]ecause the principle value of a patent is its statutory right to exclude, the nature of the patent
grant weighs against holding that monetary damages will always suffice to make the patentee
whole"); ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAw

§

9.1 (2004)

(stating that while 28 U.S.C. § 283 gives courts discretion as to whether an injunction should be
granted, in practice, courts normally grant permanent injunctions to prevailing patent owners).
" See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cit. 1989) (holding
that "it is contrary to the laws of property" to deny a patent owner's right to exclude an adjudged
infringer from further infringement, and that "it is the general rule that an injunction will issue when
infringement has been adjudged, absent a sound reason for denying it"); Trans-World Mfg. Corp.
v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("Although a district court has
discretion whether to enter an injunction, the exercise of this discretion cannot be arbitrary. A
patent gives 'the tight to exclude others from making, using or selling the invention."' (quoting 35
U.S.C. § 154 (1982)) (other citations omitted)); Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573,
1581 (Fed. Cit. 1983) (stating that a "court should not be reluctant to use its equity powers once a
party so clearly establishes his patent rights," and holding that "where validity and continuing
infringement nave been clearly established ... irreparable harm is presumed"); c Foster v. Am.
Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that "[a]n injunction to protect
a patent against infringement, like any other injunction, is an equitable remedy to be determined by
the circumstances," and that an injunction "is not intended as a club to be wielded by a patentee to
enhance his negotiating stance'). It is interesting to note that the Second Circuit in Foster was
confronted with a situation whereby the patent owner would, today, be classified as a patent troll;
the infringing party commercially used the product while the patent owner merely held the patent.
Id. In rejecting the patent owner's request for a permanent injunction, the Second Circuit stated that
"[i]n an assessment of relative equities, the court could properly conclude that to impose irreparable
hardship on the infringer by injunction, without any concomitant benefit to the patentee, would be
inequitable." Id.
" See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1458 (Fed. Cit. 1988) (stating that the
public interest required that injunction not stop supply of certain medical test kits that the patentee
was not marketing); City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cit. 1934)
(holding that injunctive relief to prevent future infringement should be denied where injunction
would have closed the city's sewage treatment plant, and in turn, endangered the lives of over
500,000 people by forcing residents to use Lake Michigan for raw sewage disposal).
" Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
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machine used for making paper bags.6" The inventor, who owned the patent,
never commercially used the patented machine and did not intend to do so.6" The
adjudged infringer had been commercially using the patented machine for a
number of years when the inventor filed a claim for infringement. 62 The
infringing party argued that because the inventor did not commercially use the
machine, the inventor should not be entitled to an injunction granting him
exclusive use.63 The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that because
the basic right granted to a patentee is the right to exclude others from use, a
patentee does not lose the right to enforce a patent through an injunction if the
patentee fails to use the patented invention.' However, the Supreme Court left
open the question whether a court may be justified in withholding injunctive relief
when the nonuse is unreasonable.65
In light of the Federal Circuit's general rule of granting a permanent injunction
upon a finding of patent infringement and the Supreme Court's ContinentalPaper
decision holding that reasonable nonuse of a patent may be protected by
injunctive relief, it would have seemed as though the practices of patent trolls
were protected by longstanding precedent. Nonetheless, when the Internet
auction giant, eBay, was found to have infringed upon patents owned by a patent
troll, MercExchange, and was enjoined from committing further infringement, the
Supreme Court took the opportunity to reevaluate the remedial practice of the
courts in terms of injunctive relief in patent infringement actions.
C. THE MERCEXCHANGE LITIGATION

1. The DistrictCourtDecision. eBay, Inc. is the operator of a popular Internet
website that permits sellers to list goods on that website and allows buyers to
purchase these goods directly from the seller by way of paying a fixed price for
the goods or by way of submitting a bid in auction format.66 MercExchange is the
holder of a number of patents, including "a business method patent for an
electronic market designed to facilitate the sale of goods between private
individuals by establishing a central authority to promote trust among
participants."67 MercExchange did not implement these patents for any

60 Id.at 417.
61

Id at 422-23.

62

Id.

63 id

' Id. at 427-30.
65 Id.
6 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
67 Id.
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commercial use of their own, but rather, licensed the use of the patents to other
companies.68 After unsuccessfully attempting to license its patents to eBay,
MercExchange filed suit claiming that eBay was infringing on a number of its
patents. 69 Following trial, a jury found that eBay willfully infringed upon two
patents owned by MercExchange, and MercExchange was awarded a final
judgment of $29.5 million in damages."0
The District Court, however, denied MercExchange's motion for a permanent
injunction." The District Court noted that the "grant of injunctive relief against
the infringer is considered the norm," but reiterated the fact that the trial judge
has discretion in determining whether an injunction is appropriate. 2 Using this
discretion, the court proceeded to evaluate whether to grant injunctive relief to
MercExchange based on traditional principles of equity by considering four
factors: "(i) whether [MercExchange] would face irreparable injury if the
injunction did not issue, (ii) whether [MercExchange] has an adequate remedy at
law, (iii) whether granting the injunction is in the public interest, and (iv) whether
the balance of the hardships tips in [MercExchange's] favor." 3
In terms of irreparable harm, the District Court noted that when validity and
infringement are found, as was found in the present case, irreparable injury is
presumed.74 However, the court stated that this was merely a presumption that
may be rebutted by evidence showing that the patent owner will not suffer
irreparable harm.7" The court held that a number of items in the record indicated
that MercExchange would not suffer irreparable harm, including "evidence of
[MercExchange's] willingness to license its patents, its lack of commercial activity
in practicing the patents, and its comments to the media" indicating that it did not
wish to seek an injunction against eBay.7 6 Moreover, MercExchange did not
move for a preliminary injunction, which suggested that it was not suffering
irreparable harm while the litigation was pending. 7
In addition to finding that MercExchange would not suffer irreparable harm
by denying injunctive relief, the District Court found that MercExchange had an

68

id

id.
" MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 722 (E.D.Va. 2003), afd in part,
69

rev'd inpart,vacated inpart,401 F.3d 1323, vacated and remanded, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
71 id
72 Id. at 711.
73 Id.

71Id.at 712.
75 Id.
76

id

77 Id.
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adequate remedy at law in the form of monetary damages."8 While conceding that
monetary damages are often inadequate in patent infringement cases, the court
noted that this was an "atypical case" because MercExchange had previously
licensed its patents and intended to continue doing so in the future.79 In
evaluating the third factor, the court held that the public interest favored the
granting of an injunction to protect MercExchange's patent rights and to maintain
the patent system's integrity. 8° However, the court noted that in light of the
"growing concern over the issuance of business-method patents," the public
interest factor equally favored the denial of injunctive relief to "protect the
public's interest in using a patented business method that the patent holder
declines to practice."'"
Finally, the District Court held that balancing the hardships indicated that an
injunction should not be granted.82 In making this determination, the court
reasoned that because MercExchange was in the business of licensing its patents,
any hardship imposed by denying injunctive relief could be alleviated through an
award of damages.83 Further, if an injunction was granted, eBay would effectively
be forced to attempt to work around MercExchange's patents, potentially
subjecting eBay to future contempt proceedings.' Because the District Court
found that three of the four factors weighed against ordering an injunction,
MercExchange's motion for entry of an injunction was denied. 5 In effect, the
District Court greatly minimized the importance of the right to exclude when
86
analyzing the traditional four-factor test.
2. The FederalCircuitDeision.On appeal to the Federal Circuit, MercExchange
challenged the denial of a permanent injunction against eBay. 7 In determining
whether the District Court erroneously denied MercExchange's motion for a
permanent injunction, the Federal Circuit cited "the general rule . . . that a
permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been
adjudged."8 The Federal Circuit reiterated that following a finding that a patent

78 Id. at

713.

79 Id.

'0 Id. at 713-14.
s Id.
82 Id. at
83

714.

Id.

84 id
8'

Id at 715.

86 See Leading Cases, Availahikv of Injuntive Relief, 120 HARv. L. REV. 332, 339-40 (2006)

(discussing the role of the tight to exclude in the District Court's decision).
' MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338-39 (Fed. Cit. 2005), vacated and
remanded, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
88 Id. at 1338 (citation omitted).
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has been infringed, a permanent injunction may justifiably be denied only in those
"rare instances" where granting the injunction would frustrate an "important
public need for the invention, such as the need to use the invention to protect
public health." 9
In light of the longstanding general rule, the Federal Circuit found that the
District Court's denial of a permanent injunction was not justified for a number
of reasons. First, according to the Federal Circuit, the District Court's holding
that denial of a permanent injunction was warranted based on the "general
concern regarding business-method patents ... is not the type of important public
need that justifies the unusual step of denying injunctive relief."9 Second, the
court concluded that the possibility of future lawsuits resulting from a defendant
attempting to work around a patent was not a sufficient basis for denying a
prevailing plaintiffs motion for a permanent injunction because a "continuing
dispute of that sort is not unusual in a patent case" and these types of disputes
would likely continue even if an injunction was denied.91 Third, the Federal
Circuit concluded that because a permanent injunction and a preliminary
injunction are "distinct forms of equitable relief," the fact that MercExchange
failed to move for a preliminary injunction should have no bearing on whether to
award a permanent injunction.9"
Finally, and most relevant to the patent troll issue, the Federal Circuit stated
that MercExchange's willingness to license its patents should be irrelevant in
determining whether to grant an injunction.93 Applying reasoning similar to that
of the Supreme Court's ContinentalPaperdecision, the Federal Circuit stated:
Injunctions are not reserved for patentees who intend to practice
their patents, as opposed to those who choose to license. The
statutory right to exclude is equally available to both groups, and the
right to an adequate remedy to enforce that right should be equally
available to both as well. If the injunction gives the patentee
additional leverage in licensing, that is a natural consequence of the
right to exclude and not an inappropriate reward to a party that

89 Id.(quoting

Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley, Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); see also supra
note 58 (listing cases in which denial of injunctive relief was found to be justified based on public
need for availability of the infringing invention).
90 MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339.
91Id.
92 Id. (quoting Lermer Germany GmbH v. Lermer Corp., 94 F.3d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
93 Id.
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does not intend to compete in the marketplace with potential
infringers.94
In rejecting nearly every factor that the District Court found supported the
denial of a permanent injunction against eBay, the Federal Circuit held that there
was "no reason to depart from the general rule that courts will issue permanent
injunctions ...absent exceptional circumstances" and reversed the District
Court's denial of injunctive relief against eBay.9 ' Just as the District Court can be
said to have minimized the role of the right to exclude in deciding to deny
injunctive relief, 6 it can also be said that the Federal Circuit maximized the
importance of the right to exclude such that "the argument can be made that one
is irreparably harmed by deprivation of the right to exclude, that monetary
damages can never adequately compensate the loss of that right, and that the
hardship inflicted by the loss of the right to exclude is invariably heavy." 97 In
response to the Federal Circuit's decision, eBay filed a petition for certiorari,
which the Supreme Court granted.
3. The Supreme CourtDecision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, eBay argued
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying injunctive relief and
that the Federal Circuit's "near-automatic" rule was contrary to the text of the
Patent Act.9 MercExchange argued that the Federal Circuit practice did not deny
a district court's discretion to grant a permanent injunction, but rather, reflected
the Federal Circuit's long-standing application of traditional principles of equity
in the patent infringement context.99
Stating that "a major departure from the long tradition of equity practice
should not be lightly implied," the Supreme Court held that the traditional fourfactor test used in determining whether to grant an injunction applies to patent
infringement actions." In making this decision, the Supreme Court relied on
both the text of the Patent Act and on remedial practice under the Copyright Act.
First, the Court noted that nothing in the Patent Act indicated that the traditional
four-prong test generally used in determining whether to grant a permanent
injunction did not apply to patent disputes."0 ' In fact, the Court pointed out that

94Id.
95 Id

96 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
97 Leading Cases, spra note 86, at 334.
98 Brief of Petitioners at 14, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-

130).
99Brief for Respondent at 13, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006) (No.
05-130).
100
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
101 Id.
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the text of the Patent Act specifically states that a district court has discretion to
grant a permanent injunction based on traditional equity principles." 2 The Court
acknowledged the Patent Act's description of patent rights as having "attributes
of personal property," including a right to exclude,"0 3 but stated that the "creation
of a right is distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that right."'"
Second, the Supreme Court compared the Copyright Act to the Patent Act,
indicating that the Copyright Act also provides copyright owners with the right
to exclude.0 5 The Court also noted that although the Copyright Act grants a
district court discretion to award a permanent injunction upon a finding of
infringement, previous attempts to establish a presumptive right to permanent
injunctive relief in the copyright context had been consistently rejected by the
Supreme Court.' 06 Thus, relying on the text of the Patent Act and on precedent
under the Copyright Act, the Court held that the issuance of permanent
injunctions is to be governed by the10 traditional
four-factor test, as applied within
7
the discretion of the district court.
Applying this reasoning to the MercExcbange action, the Supreme Court held
that both the District Court and the Federal Circuit erred by applying
"categorical" rules and vacated the lower decisions.'
Although the District
,Court purported to use the traditional four-factor test, the Supreme Court held
that the District Court erred in creating a categorical rule that would deny
injunctive relief to patent holders who do not commercially use, or who are
willing to license, their patents. 9 The Court observed that patent holders, such
as those who work in the university context or are "self-made inventors," often
lack the resources to commercially implement their inventions and must license
their patents." ° In addition to finding that the District Court's categorical rule
could unreasonably bar some patent holders from equitable relief, the Court
indicated that such categorical rules are inconsistent with the Supreme Court's

102 Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000) (stating that a court "may grant injunctions in accordance
with principles of equity").
103 See 28 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (patentee has right to exclude); 28 U.S.C. § 261 (2000) (patents

have "attributes of personal property'). The Court relied substantially on the language of Section
261 to support their holding that a right to exclude does not include the presumptive tight to
injunctive relief. MercExcbange, 126 S. Ct. at 1840. Section 261 expressly states that a patent's
"attributes of personal property" are subject to other provisions of the Patent Act, including § 283,
which grants the district court discretion to issue a permanent injunction. Id.
104 id

105 Id.
106 Id.

107

Id. at 1841.

Id. at 1840.
109 Id.
'08

110Id.
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ContinentalPaperdecision."' The Court also held that the Federal Circuit similarly
erred when it adopted a categorical rule in favor of injunctions in all cases of
which "departed in the opposite
infringement (except in rare circumstances),
' 2
direction from the four-factor test." 1
In sum, the Supreme Court held that both the District Court and Federal
Circuit erred and vacated the Federal Circuit judgment. Thus, the Federal Circuit
must abandon the long-standing general rule that an injunction will automatically
issue upon a finding of patent validity and infringement. In place of the general
fourrule, a district court, in exercising its discretion, must apply the traditional
3
factor test when deciding whether to issue a permanent injunction."
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's MercExchange decision, which rejected the general
practice of granting an automatic injunction following a finding of infringement,
indicated that the power of the patent troll had been reduced. However, the
Supreme Court failed to offer any guidance to the lower courts on how to apply
the traditional four-factor test in the patent infringement context. As a result of
this lack of guidance, it is possible that lower courts will apply the four-factor test
differently. In fact, a preliminary examination of district court decisions after
MercExchangehas revealed that some jurisdictions are more willing than others to
grant injunctive relief. To the extent that district courts apply the test differently,
patent trolls will avoid the MercExchangedecision by seeking a forum perceived to
be more favorable to the plaintiff. Thus, MercExchange will not likely reduce the
power of the patent troll to a significant degree.
Although the MercExchange decision will not likely reduce the power of the
patent troll, Congress can further reduce the power of the patent troll by enacting
legislation to that effect. Some potential reforms that Congress may adopt in an
effort to reduce the power of patent trolls include improving the review of
business-method patents, weakening the presumption of validity for business-

...Id.at 1840-41.
112 Id. at 1841.
also
id at 1841-42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting that the traditional four-factor test
113 Id.;
see
does not require courts to examine each patent as if "writing on an entirely clean slate," but rather
at 1842-43 (Kennedy, J.,
emphasizing that prior, similar cases may be taken into consideration); id.
concurring) (making reference to the rise of patent trolls and suggesting that monetary damages may
be adequate when a patent troll is involved). Both of these concurrences suggest that although lower
courts must apply traditional principles of equity, the Supreme Court continues to believe that a
permanent injunction will be appropriate in many cases. In addition, these concurrences may reflect
the court's reluctance to minirmize the importance of the right to exclude to the same degree as the
District Court. See Leadhng Cases, supra note 86, at 339-40.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol14/iss2/5

16

Myers: Reeling in the Patent Troll: Was Ebay v. MercExchange Enough?

2007]

PATENT TROLLING

method patents, eliminating the submarine patent, and providing that a court
consider the patent troll's actual contribution to the overall product or service
when determining the extent of monetary or equitable relief
A. IMPLICATIONS OF MERCEXCHANGE

Because the patent troll often uses the threat of an permanent injunction as
leverage to extract exorbitant licensing fees from alleged infringers, the Supreme
Court's rejection of the Federal Circuit's general rule suggests that the power of
the patent troll has been significantly weakened. In fact, advocates of the Federal
Circuit's general rule favoring injunctions argue that rejection of the general rule
by the Supreme Court effectively forces the patent troll to enter into a
compulsory license with the adjudged infringer.114 However, the fact that the
Supreme Court rejected the District Court's categorical rule and declined the
opportunity to reconsider the ContinentalPaperdecision indicates that the patent
troll will not likely be inhibited. Because a patent troll can still attempt to show
that it has satisfied the traditional four-factor test, it is unclear whether, in
practice, the MercExchangedecision will do anything to diminish the power of the
,roll.
The MercExcbange decision can best be described as a drafting guide that
reminds the lower courts that they must apply traditional principles of equity, by
using the four-factor test used in many other contexts, when deciding whether to
grant a permanent injunction in patent infringement cases. However, the Federal
Circuit's general rule granting a permanent injunction may simply be a reflection
that in the vast majority of patent infringement cases, all four prongs of the
traditional test will favor injunctive relief."5 Indeed, because the right to exclude,
which is typically protected by injunctive relief in other contexts, is among the
rights granted upon issuance of a patent, courts generally find that granting a
permanent injunction is the only way to protect the right to exclude when a patent
has been infringed." 6 In other words, once a valid patent has been infringed,
courts will generally find that the patent owner has been irreparably harmed due
to violation of the owner's right to exclude. These findings, in turn, indicate that
14 See Brief for General Electric Company et al. as Amid Curiae Suggesting Affirnance at 16,

eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130). Of course, the Supreme
Court's holding does not implicate a compulsory licensing scheme. Because the Supreme Court
rejected the District Court's categorical rule that an injunction will not issue when the patentee does
not commercially use or is willing to license its patents, the Supreme Court's holding falls short of
mandating a license. Rather, an injunction is still available to those patent owners, including patent
trolls, who can satisfy the traditional four-prong test.
"s Brief for Respondent, supra note 99, at 12-13.
116 Ia .
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monetary damages will not be adequate to compensate for a continuing violation
of the right to exclude."n Further, as courts balance the hardships imposed on
the respective parties, it is highly unlikely that an adjudged infringer will succeed
in persuading a court that the harm suffered as a result of an injunction will
outweigh 8the patent owner's loss of the right to exclude if an injunction is not
granted!"
Of course, following the MercExchangedecision, district courts are free to use
their discretion as to what facts they feel are important to their analysis under the
traditional four-factor test, provided that they do not abuse their discretion by
adopting a categorical rule." 9 However, because of the Supreme Court's failure
to provide guidance as to how to apply the test, district courts may apply factors
differently, resulting in conflicting holdings. 20 For example, one district court
may hold that a patent owner who does not commercially use the patent will not
be irreparably harmed and should only be awarded monetary damages, whereas
another district court may hold to the contrary. Nonetheless, as Chief Justice
Roberts observed in MercExchange, courts should adhere to the principle that "like
cases should be decided alike." 12' Because injunctions have been granted in the
overwhelming majority of patent infringement cases, one would expect that under
this principle, a drastic change in remedial practice among district courts is
unlikely.
A number of district courts have applied the MercExchange ruling in deciding
22
whether to grant an injunction following a finding of patent infringement.

117 Id.
118 Id

119eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006) (vacating based on the
Federal Circuit's adoption of a categorical rule).
120 See id. (offering no guidance as to how to apply the four-factor test other than the mere
statement that the lower courts applied the test incorrectly).
121 Id. at 1842 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
122 See Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (vacating district court's
order granting permanent injunction and remanding for analysis under MercExcbange);3M Innovative
Prop. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., No. 01-1781, 2006 WL 2735499 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2006)
(refusing to force patent owner to license patent and granting permanent injunction); Voda v. Cordis
Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5,2006) (denying injunctive relief);
Floe Int'l, Inc. v. Newmans' Mfg., Inc., No. 04-5120, 2006 WL 2472112 (D. Minn. Aug. 23,2006)
(granting motion for permanent injunction); Paice, L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-21 1,
2006 WL 2385139 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (denying permanent injunction); Telequip Corp. v.
Change Exchange, No. 5:01 -CV-1 748, 2006 WL 2385425 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006) (focusing on
the right to exclude in applying traditional four-factor test and granting permanent injunction
following finding of infringement); Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfield Servs., No. CIV-04-1693-C, 2006
WL 2128851 (W.D. Okla.July 27,2006) (granting injunction following finding of infringement); z4
Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437,444 (E.D. Tex. June 14,2006) (denying motion
for permanent injunction after finding ofinfringement); Tivo, Inc. v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 446
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Analysis of these cases indicates that some courts may be more willing to deny
injunctive relief after the MercExcbangedecision despite earlier precedent, whereas
many others continue to grant injunctive relief."2 Thus, as a result of the
Supreme Court's lack of guidance, decisions on whether to grant injunctive relief
have been inconsistent across districts.124 To the extent that district courts may
apply the traditional four-factor test differently, patent trolls may be encouraged
to shop for a forum that tends to favor patent owners. In addition, because the
Federal Circuit may no longer apply the general rule favoring injunctions when
reviewing cases on appeal, a district court granting a permanent injunction based
on satisfaction of the traditional four-factor test will be reversed only if the
Federal Circuit finds an abuse of discretion. 125 Thus, inconsistencies among
district courts will be perpetuated.
In sum, the MercExchangedecision seems, at first glance, to diminish the power
of the patent troll; however in practice, patent trolls will be, at most, only slightly
affected by the ruling. Because the Federal Circuit's general rule can be
characterized as a simplification of the application of traditional principles of
equity in the patent infringement context under the doctrine that like cases should
be decided alike, it is unlikely that the majority of district courts will substantially
decrease the practice of granting permanent injunctions. Nonetheless, some
district courts will undoubtedly adopt a practice of denying permanent injunctions
in some circumstances. However, the patent troll will simply avoid those district
courts that deny injunctive relief by seeking a more favorable forum.'26 Thus, the
mere fact that a district court has discretion to grant an injunction will not likely
be enough to stop the practice of trolling. In order to diminish the power of a
patent troll, further reforms in patent law are necessary.
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER REFORM

Because the MercExchange decision most likely falls short of significantly
diminishing the power of the patent troll, further patent reform is needed.
Although there are certainly many ways in which patent law could be reformed,

F. Supp. 2d 664, 669-70 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (granting permanent injunction after extensive analysis
using traditional four-factor test).
123 See The Fire of Genius, injunctions, http://www.thefireo fgenius.com/injunctions (last visited
Mar. 12, 2007) (offering up-to-date results of courts applying MercExchange).
124 See Leading Cases, supra note 86, at 338 (stating that "unguided discretion" has the effect of
"undermining the Federal Circuit's congressional mission to bring consistency to patent law").
125 Id.
126 See Hearing, supra note 8, at 31 (Statement of Chuck Fish, Vice President and Chief Patent
Counsel, Time Warner, Inc.) (noting that "[ain aggressive patent plaintiff can sue almost anywhere
in the U.S." and that some patent trolls are seeking jurisdictions viewed as "pro-plaintiff").
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improving the United States Patent and Trademark Offices (USPTO) review of
business-method patent applications, adjusting the presumption of validity in
business-method patent infringement actions, eliminating the submarine patent
application, and awarding damages representing the patent troll's contribution to
the overall product or service could potentially reduce the power of the patent
troll. Accordingly, Congress should enact legislation providing for the following
reforms.
1. Improving Review of Business-Method Patents. One potential way to limit the
power of the patent troll is to improve the USPTO's review of business-method
patents. 27 Many of the patent infringement claims asserted by patent trolls are
based on business-method patents. Indeed, both Research in Motion (RIM) and
eBay were confronted with patent trolls alleging that a business-method patent
2
had been infringed.1 1
Many business-method patents are of suspect validity because they are
generally obvious when compared to the prior art. 29 The problems of validity
regarding business-method patents are a result of the USPTO's inadequate
resources and lack of prior art sources to aid in examining applications for
business-method patents. 3 ° Increased funding for the USPTO is an obvious
remedy advocated by many. 3'
In addition, expanding the number of patent examiners-particularly those
with expertise in business-method prior art-will create more time to review prior
art. The addition of examiners with expertise in business practices will also assist
in developing an adequate source bank of relevant prior art and potentially reduce
the costs of avoiding infringement. Because patent trolls often assert
questionable business-method patents, improving the USPTO's review of these
applications will reduce the granting of questionable business-method patents.

"2 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-77 (Fed.
Cit. 1998) (establishing that business-methods are patentable subject matter). Business-method
patents are controversial because, in part, there exists scant prior art regarding these patents. See
general# Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cit. 2001) (offering
a great illustration of the problems regarding business-method patents).
125 See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282,1288-89 (Fed. Cit. 2005) (businessmethod patent for implementing wireless messaging device); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006) (business-method patent for implementing internet website allowing
sellers to list goods and allowing buyers to directly purchase from seller).
129 See FED. TRADE CoMM., To PROMOTE INNOVATION:
THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 1, p. 3 0 (2003), available athttp://www.ftc.gov/
os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC REPORT] (indicating that patent examiners
reviewing an application rarely spend more than twenty-five hours researching prior art due to the
staggering number of patent applications filed each year).
130See id.
131 Id.
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Thus, Congress should enact legislation providing the USPTO with adequate
resources to improve the review of business-method patents.
2. Weakening the Presumption of Validity for Business-Method Patents. Because
business-method patents currently tend to be of suspect validity, these patents
should not be entitled to a strong presumption of validity upon review until the
USPTO becomes competent in examining business-method patents.' 32 Currently,
courts require that a party challenging a patent establish that the patent is invalid
by "clear and convincing evidence."'' Because the USPTO is not adequately
prepared to review applications for business-method patents, granting this
burdensome presumption of validity may be unjustified. Weakening the
presumption of validity for business-method patent infringement actions would
allow courts to invalidate those business-method patents that should not have
been granted in the first place. Because patent trolls generally hold questionable
business-method patents, this may substantially reduce their power to extract
exorbitant licensing fees. Thus, Congress should enact legislation reducing the
presumption of validity in cases involving the review of business-method patents.
3. Elimination ofthe SubmarinePatent. Elimination of the submarine patent may
also reduce the power of the patent troll. Patent trolls often utilize this practice
by filing an application domestically and then deliberately postponing the grant
of the patent, sometimes for years.'34 During this time, an unknowing party may
invest significant resources to implement a product or service that potentially
infringes upon the submarine patent application. Once the patent finally issues,
the patent troll will likely seek a large licensing fee.
By requiring that all patents be published after eighteen months, regardless of
whether the applicant agrees to seek protection only in the United States, the
power of patent trolls will be reduced because they will no longer be able to keep
the patent application from becoming discoverable prior art. Thus, as long as the
prior art is properly reviewed, potential infringers can learn of the application
before substantial investment. Consequently, Congress should amend the Patent
Act to eliminate the submarine patent.
4. Requiring Representative Damages. Patent trolls currently benefit from their
ability to gain injunctive relief against an infringing party regardless of the subject
matter of their patent.'35 For instance, the patent may cover only a trivial aspect

132

See 35 U.S.C. §282 (2000) ("A patent shall be presumed valid."); FTC REPORT, supra note 129,

at 8-10 (recommending legislation to change the standard from clear and convincing evidence to
preponderance of the evidence); see general# Symposium, Ideas into Action: Implementing Reform ofthe
PatentSystem, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1053, 1100-22 (2004) (lengthy discussion of FTC Report).
133 FTC REPORT, supra note 129, at 8-10.
134 See Supreme Court Development, supra note 47, at 1006 (discussing the submarine patent).
135 See Hearings,supra note 8, at 30-31 (statement of Chuck Fish, Vice President and Chief Patent
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of the overall product or service; yet the patent troll will be able to extract
monetary or equitable relief representing the total value of the product or
6
service.

13

Rather than allowing patent trolls to recover damages that are disproportionate
to their contribution to the overall product or service, Congress should enact
legislation requiring courts to consider the degree of the patent owner's overall
contribution to that product or service. If the patent covers only a small portion
of the overall product or service, courts should award a reasonable royalty for use
of the patent and decline injunctive relief. Of course, this suggestion should not
apply to patent owners who commercially implement their patent for their own
use, as they may suffer irreparable harm if compelled to license a patent that they
use. However, those who do not use the patent themselves, but rather license the
use of the patent, should be limited to a reasonable royalty representing their
contribution to the overall product. Because patent trolls do not implement their
patents for their own commercial use, limiting the potential award from
infringement to an amount that fairly represents their contribution will make it
less advantageous for the patent troll to wait until a potential infringer is highly
invested in a product or service.
IV. CONCLUSION

Although the practice of licensing patents is a justifiable business model for
many patent owners, patent trolls exploit the patent system by asserting
questionable claims of infringement in hopes of extracting large settlement fees.
Prior to the MercExcbangedecision, patent trolls utilized both the submarine patent
and the threat of a permanent injunction to achieve this objective. This practice
of trolling has the negative effects of raising transaction costs, raising the costs
associated with licensing and avoiding infringement, and deterring innovation.
While the Supreme Court's decision to reject the general practice of granting
permanent injunctive relief following a finding of infringement may appear likely,
in theory, to inhibit the practice of trolling, the MercExchangedecision, standing
alone, will not likely inhibit the patent troll to any significant degree. Because the
Supreme Court provided virtually no guidance to district courts as to how the
traditional four-factor test should be applied in the patent infringement context,
jurisdictions have not applied the test uniformly. To the extent that some
jurisdictions may favor granting injunctive relief following a finding of
infringement, the patent troll will simply shop for a favorable forum.

Counsel, Tithie Warner, Inc.).
136

Id.
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355

In order to truly reduce the power of the patent troll, congressional action is
necessary. More specifically, Congress should act to improve the USPTO's
review of business-method patents, reduce the presumption of validity in patent
infringement cases involving business-method patents, eliminate the submarine
patent, and provide for monetary and equitable relief that represents the patent
troll's actual contribution to the overall product or service. Until Congress enacts
legislation aimed at deterring trolling activity, the patent troll will continue to seek
exorbitant sums of money from alleged infringers.
Damian Myers
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